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 1I n troduction
Primary markets diﬀer in the procedures that are used to price securities and to allocate
them to investors. In Treasury auctions, investors submit bids, and then securities are
priced and allocated according to explicit rules. Other primary markets feature pricing and
allocation decisions that are made in a more discretionary way. One such example is the
method of bookbuilding which is commonly used in initial public oﬀerings of shares (IPOs).
In bookbuilt IPOs, underwriters collect investors’ indications of interest, and then exercise
discretion in the pricing and allocation of the securities.
Many of the pricing and allocation procedures observed in primary markets have been
interpreted as direct mechanisms. Inspired by the U.S. Treasury’s experiments with uniform-
price auctions for selling Treasury notes, Back and Zender (1993) compare diﬀerent auction
formats with a direct mechanism. Biais, Bossaerts and Rochet (2002) derive an optimal
mechanism for pricing IPO shares and ﬁnd that uniform pricing is optimal.
In this paper, we investigate uniform-price mechanisms for selling securities in primary
markets. We analyze how the structure of this mechanism is aﬀected by a striking vari-
ation across primary markets: the existence of a market for when-issued trading of some
unseasoned securities, but not of others. For example, while there is an active market for
when-issued trading of U.S. Treasury securities, no such market exists for IPO shares in the
U.S.
The fact that there is no when-issued trading of IPO shares in the U.S. stands in contrast
to other countries. Germany, in particular, stands out as a country with a very active when-
issued market for IPO shares. This market operates concurrently with a bookbuilding process
in which underwriters collect indications of interest from investors. While bookbuilding is
well-recognized as a potential source of information for IPO pricing, practitioners may also
view the when-issued market as an indicator for how IPOs should be priced. To quote
one of the largest market makers in the German when-issued market, this market aﬀects
IPO pricing in that: “By observing when-issued trading, the underwriter can gauge the
market’s interest in an IPO.”1 Aussenegg et al. (2003) analyze a German IPO market and
1This quote was taken from the website of Schnigge AG, http://www.schnigge.de/info/service/pre-ipo-trading.html. The
1ﬁnd evidence consistent with this quote. However, they also ﬁnd that when-issued trading
does not supplant bookbuilding as a source of information. Instead, underwriters seem
to conduct bookbuilding to gather information before they post price ranges. When-issued
trading commences after the ranges have been posted; this trading indicates how IPOs should
be priced relative to the price ranges.
We compare IPO pricing, using only bookbuilding as a source of relevant information,
and IPO pricing in the presence of a market for when-issued trading. We argue that when-
issued trading can be beneﬁcial since bookbuilding may be limited as a means of reducing
IPO underpricing. We then analyze the interaction between bookbuilding and when-issued
trading. This analysis provides a rationale for the ﬁndings of Aussenegg et al. (2003). We
show that when-issued trading may fail to open unless informational asymmetries (about the
value of IPO shares) have ﬁrst been alleviated. This can be done if the underwriter conducts
bookbuilding and then publicly releases information that has been learned. Consistent with
this result, when-issued trading never opens in Germany before the underwriters post price
ranges that give investors an indication of how they plan to price IPO shares. Finally, we
analyze how the presence of a when-issued market aﬀects the form of the optimal direct
mechanism to elicit information from investors. We ﬁnd that the presence of a when-issued
market can greatly change the nature of the optimal mechanism, if this market can open
irrespective of whether bookbuilding is conducted ﬁrst. However, if the when-issued market
cannot open on its own, then the direct mechanism is less aﬀected by this market. In this
case, we can show that the presence of a liquid when-issued market may increase the cost of
conducting bookbuilding, but only in very special circumstances, i.e. when a very small num-
bero fi nvestors have access to some piece of relevant information. If some pricing-relevant
information is dispersed among investors, then when-issued trading provides a strictly pos-
itive beneﬁt in pricing IPOs. Thus, we argue that it is only in the case that information is
very closely held that a liquid when-issued market may be harmful to issuers. Otherwise,
allowing for such a market should beneﬁt issuers.
Our paper extends the existing literature on the pricing of unseasoned securities. We
orginal quote was in German: “Der Emissionsf¨ uhrer kann auf Grund der Handelst¨ atigkeit im Handel per Erscheinen das Interesse
des Marktes an der Neuemission messen.”
2build on the models of Rock (1986) and Benveniste and Spindt (1989). This paper is also re-
lated to the literature on when-issued markets. Bikchandani and Huang (1993) and Nyborg
and Sundaresan (1996) examine the when-issued market for U.S. Treasury securities. L¨ oﬄer,
Panther and Theissen (2002) examine the when-issued market for Neuer Markt IPOs and
ﬁnd that the ﬁnal prices in this market are unbiased predictors of opening prices in the sec-
ondary market. Dorn (2002) examines this same when-issued market to investigate whether
sentiment drives retail participation. Ezzel, Miles and Mulherin (2002) examine when-issued
trading of shares of publicly traded subsidiaries prior to full divestiture.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief description of
relevant institutional aspects of several primary markets. In the third section, we present the
rationale for when-issued trading of IPO shares in a simpliﬁed analysis that fails to address
several possible caveats. These caveats are dealt with in the remainder of the paper. In
particular, in Section 5 we examine the opening of the when-issued market. In Section 6 we
model the direct mechanism for eliciting information from investors, both with and without
when-issued trading.
2A selective survey of institutional features of primary markets
In this section, we brieﬂy survey the structure of some primary markets. This survey high-
lights a diﬀerence between the institutional framework of U.S. Treasury markets and that
of U.S. IPOs: the existence of a market for when-issued (forward) trading of Treasuries but
not for IPO shares. We point out that some European markets feature when-issued trading
of IPOs, and we describe one notable example, the German Neuer Markt.
When-issued trading of Treasury securities: Bikhchandani and Huang (1993) and Nyborg
and Sundaresan (1996) provide detailed descriptions of institutional features of the primary
market for U.S. Treasury securities, including the market for when-issued trading of Trea-
suries. The when-issued market is a forward market for trading in not yet issued securities.
Trading starts on the date of the announcement of a Treasury auction and continues after the
auction takes place (up until the issue date). The forward contracts represent commitments
3to trade when, and if, the security is issued. The contracts specify physical delivery of the
underlying security on the date at which this security is issued.
Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996) give an assessment of the role of when-issued trading in
the process of selling Treasuries. They argue that the when-issued market plays a price
discovery role in that this market generates and aggregates information about the expected
depth of a Treasury auction and the diversity of auction participants.
Initial public oﬀerings of shares: Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001), Ritter and Welch (2002),
and Ritter (2002) provide recent surveys of the institutional structure of IPO markets and the
extensive literature on IPOs. Lungqvist, Jenkinson and Wilhelm (2003) point out that the
U.S. method of IPO pricing through bookbuilding has become increasingly popular outside
the U.S. We therefore choose to focus on this method for IPO pricing in our analysis be-
low. Price discovery through bookbuilding diﬀers from price discovery through when-issued
trading in that, in bookbuilding information is gathered directly from investors. According
to Benveniste and Spindt (1989), in order to provide incentives for investors to truthfully
reveal positive information about an issue, underwriters only partially adjust the IPO prices
in response to such information. The underwriters then allocate underpriced shares to those
investors who provided the positive information. Hence, the investors who hold positive
information earn informational rents.
When-issued trading of IPO shares: In the United States, Treasury issues and IPOs diﬀer
in that there is no market for when-issued trading of IPO shares. Such when-issued trading
is restricted by securities laws;2 the stated reason for the restriction is: “Such short sales
could result in a lower oﬀering price and reduce an issuer’s proceeds.”3
In contrast to IPO markets in the U.S., those in many European countries feature when-
issued trading of IPO shares. Since many of these markets also employ bookbuilding methods
to price IPOs, this implies that there are potentially two sources of information for IPO
2Regulation M, Rule 105 prohibits the covering of short positions in IPO shares that were created within the last ﬁve days
before pricing, with allocations received in the IPO. In addition to this rule, there are also restrictions on trading in unregistered
shares.
3See Paragraph II.F. of the Securities Exchange Act Release No. 38067(December 20, 1996) on Regulation M, found at the
webaddress, http://www.sec.gov/rules/ﬁnal/34-38067.txt. Regulation M became eﬀective on March 4, 1997.
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pricing. Price discovery may take place both through the market for when-issued trading (by
analogy to Nyborg and Sundaresan (1996)), and through a direct mechanism in bookbuilding
(as suggested by Benveniste and Spindt (1989)).
Aussenegg et al. (2003) investigate one notable example of an IPO market with book-
building and when-issued trading of IPO shares, the German Neuer Markt IPO market.
They provide a detailed description of the institutional framework of this market that can
be summarized by Figure 1. This ﬁgure provides a stylized timeline to illustrate the tim-
ing of bookbuilding and when-issued trading on the Neuer Markt. The timeline has three
stages, the period before the opening of when-issued trading (Stage 1), the period during
which when-issued trading occurs (Stage 2), and the period after when-issued trading (Stage
3). During Stage 1, the underwriters may gather information to use in setting price ranges.
When-issued trading opens at time tW, after these ranges are set.4 As in U.S. Treasury
markets, such trading is in forward contracts that specify physical delivery. When-issued
trading continues beyond the time tP at which the underwriters set the IPO oﬀer prices, up
to the evening before the ﬁrst day of trading in the secondary market.
4The price ranges are binding in that underwriters do not set oﬀer prices above posted ranges. See Ljungqvist and Wilhelm
(2002) and Aussenegg et al (2003).
53 The rationale for when-issued trading: a simple model
There have been numerous explanations as to why underpricing occurs in IPOs. Many of
the theories use as their starting point the problem of adverse selection in primary markets
due to asymmetries of information across investors, as modeled by Rock (1986). Benveniste
and Spindt (1989) showed how the process of eliciting information through bookbuilding can
lead to IPO underpricing. Maksimovic and Pichler (2002) showed how these two ideas are
directly linked in that the optimal amount of information gathering through bookbuilding
depends on the adverse selection risk, as well as on how the bookbuilding is done. Loughran
and Ritter (2002a) and (2002b) take an agency theoretic perspective. They argue that
underwriters beneﬁt from underpricing IPOs in the form of quid pro quos. In Loughran and
Ritter (2002a) they argue further that issuers may be willing to accept large amounts of
underpricing if the issue price is much higher than what they had originally expected.
In our analysis we will focus on informational reasons, rather than agency reasons, for
IPO underpricing. Our starting point is the adverse selection problem modeled by Rock.
Since this problem is due to informational asymmetries across investors, it can be mitigated
if the IPO oﬀer price can be set based on information that is held by the more informed
investors. This seems to be what underwriters can accomplish through bookbuilding. How-
ever, for several reasons bookbuilding may be of limited eﬀectiveness. First, some of the
information that is relevant for IPO pricing may not reside with the investors who partic-
ipate in bookbuilding. Second, investors’ information may be noisy, making it impossible
to fully resolve informational asymmetries across investors if only a limited number of them
participate in bookbuilding. As such, there will remain residual adverse selection risk due to
the presence of investors whose information was not obtained through bookbuilding. Finally,
bookbuilding may itself be a reason for IPO underpricing. As modeled by Benveniste and
Spindt (1989), underpricing may be required in order to pay informed investors rents for
revealing their information directly to the underwriter.
We present in this section a very simple model of IPO pricing that incorporates all three
of the limits of bookbuilding mentioned above. The objective of this section is to illustrate,
in the simplest manner possible, the potential value of a market for when-issued trading of
6IPO shares, as a source of information for IPO pricing. The model presented here provides
the foundation for the analysis of the following sections in which we will explore in depth
the potential pros and cons of allowing when-issued trading.
We next present the elements of our model. We ﬁrst specify how the value of IPO
shares depends on two kinds of information, only one of which is held by informed investors
who might participate in bookbuilding. We then deﬁne the objective function that the
underwriter maximizes in pricing the IPO. We will use an objective function that is similar
to that proposed by Hughes and Thakor (1992). As will be discussed below, we choose this
objective function in order to introduce a reason why the underwriter cares about information
that cannot be obtained through bookbuilding. The reason is that the underwriter is averse
to overpricing the IPO. This reasoning is inspired in part by Hughes and Thakor (1992)
and by Nanda and Yun (1997). Nanda and Yun ﬁnd that, for IPOs that are signiﬁcantly
overpriced, the lead underwriter suﬀers a negative impact on equity market value. This
impact is greater than what can be attributed to the cost of price stabilization. Thus,
overpricing is costly.5
The value of IPO shares: As our focus is on valuation, we will take as exogenous the number
of shares that are sold in the IPO; only the oﬀer price will be endogenous. We will also assume
that the oﬀering is uniform price, in that all investors at the IPO pay the same price. As
a simpliﬁcation, we will normalize to one the number of shares issued at the IPO. ˜ V is the
unknown secondary market value of this share.6 Prior to the IPO there are two sources of
uncertainty about the realization of ˜ V :
˜ V = v0 +˜ sw + ˜ d, (1)
where v0 is the prior expected value of ˜ V , w is a positive parameter that is strictly less than
v0,˜ s is a random variable that can take on the realizations 1 or –1, and ˜ d is a random variable
5Overpricing at the IPO can also be costly for issuers, in that it may be taken as a negative signal about the ﬁrm. For
entrepreneurs who retain large share ownership, or for ﬁrms that engage in follow up oﬀerings, the cost of such a signal can
easily outweigh the beneﬁt of higher IPO proceeds. In addition, some issuers conduct IPOs with the objective of advertising
their ﬁrms. See for example Demers and Lewellen (2002).
6More speciﬁcally, in order to match existing empirical literature we will think of ˜ V as the value based on the ﬁrst day
closing price in the secondary market.
7that is uniformly distributed on the interval [−δ,δ].7 (We assume that v0 −w −δ ≥ 0.) The
model of equation (1) and the parameters v0, w, and δ are all common knowledge. A key
diﬀerence between the two random components of the share value ˜ V is that one of these
variables, ˜ s, has been observed, albeit noisily, by a number of informed investors, whereas
no individual investors have private information about the other variable, ˜ d. Therefore,
the component ˜ sw of the value is due to information that the underwriter can obtain from
informed investors who participate in bookbuilding. By contrast, we interpret the variable
˜ d as dispersed information that the underwriter cannot obtain from a limited number of
investors.
The prior distribution on ˜ s is that each outcome (1 or -1) will occur with a probability of
one-half. Thus, for an uninformed investor, the prior expected value of ˜ s is zero. A number
of informed investors have observed signals of ˜ s; the signal of investor i is a random variable
˜ ςi which can take on one of two realizations, ςi ∈{ − 1,1}. Conditional on the realization
of ˜ s, the signals ˜ ςi and ˜ ςj of any two informed investors i and j are independent of each
other. Moreover, these signals are identically distributed: with probability q>1/2, any
given informed investor has correctly observed the realization of ˜ s.F or an investor who sees
ap ositive signal, the probability that s =1i sq and the probability that s = −1i s1− q,
so that the expected value of ˜ s is given by q − (1 − q)=2 q − 1 > 0. For an investor who
sees a negative signal, the expected value of ˜ s is 1 − 2q<0. We will assume that a fraction
α (0 <α<1) of all potential investors are informed. On average, a fraction qα of investors
will have correctly observed the realization of ˜ s and (1 − q)α will have observed −˜ s.
Adverse selection risk, bookbuilding, and IPO pricing: The presence of informed investors
implies that uninformed investors face an adverse selection risk when investing in IPO shares.
The reason is as follows: Suppose that the underwriter prices the IPO at the prior expected
value of v0. Because q>1/2, fewer informed investors invest in IPO shares when the issue
is overpriced (s = −1) than when it is underpriced (s = 1). Thus, uninformed investors
will be allocated more shares when the issue is overpriced. In order to induce uninformed
investors to buy IPO shares, the oﬀering must be priced so that it is a “fair bet” for them.
7A list of variables with their deﬁnitions is given at the beginning of the Appendix.
8This is done by pricing the issue at v0−uAS, where uAS ≥ 0i sexpected underpricing due to
adverse selection risk. As long as there are some investors who are strictly better informed
than others, uAS will be strictly positive.
The underwriter can, through bookbuilding, mitigate the problem of adverse selection
risk. To discuss this in the simplest manner possible, we abstain (for now) from modeling
the bookbuilding process itself. Instead, we just assume that, during this process, the un-
derwriter uses a direct mechanism to induce a number of informed investors to truthfully
report the realizations of their signals. We will represent the number of positive signals
that are reported in bookbuilding minus the number of negative signals with the symbol z.
Underpricing due to residual adverse selection risk is a function of z,8 and so can be written
as uAS(z). For any ﬁnite value of z, underpricing due to adverse selection risk is positive:
uAS(z) > 0. However, it is shown in the next section that for all |z|≥1, uAS(z) <u AS(0)
and uAS(z)i sdecreasing in |z|.T h us, gathering information through bookbuilding (|z|≥1)
lowers underpricing due to adverse selection risk. It may be necessary, however, to oﬀer
underpriced shares to informed investors in order to induce them to truthfully report their
signals. We will let uB (uB ≥ 0) denote the expected level of IPO underpricing required to
obtain such reports in bookbuilding. The level of expected underpricing that both induces
investors to report their information and that encourages uninformed investors to partici-
pate in the oﬀering is max[uAS(z),u B]. Both of these values are precisely modeled in later
sections. For what follows in this section we need only know that these values place lower
bounds on underpricing, and that the bounds may be strictly positive.
The underwriter’s objective function in IPO pricing: We assume that the underwriter is risk
neutral and wishes to maximize IPO proceeds, minus the expected cost of overpricing. More
formally, the underwriter’s objective function is given by:
max
pI
Π=pI − c(pI − E[˜ V |pI > ˜ V,z]) prob{pI > ˜ V |z}, (2)
where pI is the oﬀer price and c(pI − ˜ V )i sthe penalty for overpricing. We assume that this
pricing problem is constrained due to a requirement that the issue be priced so that retail
8We use the term residual adverse selection risk to refer to the adverse selection risk that remains due to the presence of
informed investors whose information is not contained in z.
9investors will be willing to participate. As discussed above, expected underpricing must
be at least as large as max[uAS(z),u B].9 Thus the underwriter must satisfy the following
constraint when solving (2):
pI ≤ E[˜ V |z] − max[uAS(z),u B]. (3)
The objective function (2) is somewhat similar to that modeled in Hughes and Thakor
(1992). The main diﬀerence is that, in their model the underwriter knows strictly more than
the investors, whereas our underwriter is not better informed. Instead, we assume that there
is some information that the underwriter can learn from investors and some information, ˜ d,
which the underwriter cannot obtain through bookbuilding. In their model, for litigation
to occur (i.e., a cost to be imposed on the underwriter), there must be a belief that the
underwriter has purposely overpriced the issue. In our model the underwriter does not
misrepresent information; overpricing happens by chance. However, the underwriter can
lower the odds, and the expected extent, of overpricing both by collecting information to
reduce uncertainty and by underpricing in expected value.
Even without explicitly solving the problem (2), we can see that the optimal issue price
will either be the price that solves (2) as an unconstrained problem, or it will be the price
that satisﬁes (3) with equality. The price that solves (2) can be represented as E[˜ V |z]−uM,
where uM is derived below and represents the expected underpricing that occurs due the
underwriter’s concern about overpricing (making a mistake). Thus, expected underpricing
will be the maximum needed due to each of three possible reasons for IPO underpricing:
the cost of avoiding overpricing (uM), the cost of adverse selection risk (uAS(z)) and the
expected cost of bookbuilding (uB).
As discussed above, bookbuilding can decrease the expected level of IPO underpricing
due to adverse selection risk, but at a cost represented by uB.I nfact, information gathering
through bookbuilding should optimally be done up to the point that uAS(z)=uB in expec-
tation.10 Bookbuilding can also decrease IPO underpricing due to the underwriter’s concern
about committing an overpricing mistake. However, this is only possible to a limited extent.
9The underwriter may choose not to conduct bookbuilding, in which case z = uB =0 .
10See Maksimovic and Pichler (2002).
10We show in the next paragraph that uM may remain strictly positive even if the under-
writer obtains perfect information about the realization of ˜ s. This is because bookbuilding
is not suited for gathering dispersed information about the value of IPO shares. That is,
bookbuilding cannot eliminate uncertainty about ˜ d.
Determination of uM: If there are two sources of uncertainty about the value of IPO shares,
˜ s and ˜ d, then the derivation of the oﬀer price that maximizes the objective function (2) is
complicated by the fact that the functional form of the second term of (2) varies across the
parameter space. The full derivation of this problem is given in the Appendix. We derive
here a simpler version of the problem in which we assume that all uncertainty about ˜ s has
been resolved through bookbuilding, so that ˜ V = v0 +sw + ˜ d and E[˜ V |z]=v0 +sw.I nthis
case,
E[pI − ˜ V |pI > ˜ V,z] prob{pI > ˜ V |z} =
(pI − v0 − sw + δ)2
4δ


























Concern about overpricing results in underpricing only if the cost of overpricing is high
enough (c>2). The reason for this is that the underwriter faces a tradeoﬀ between avoiding
overpricing and maximizing IPO proceeds.
The more general solution, in which there is residual uncertainty about ˜ s even after
bookbuilding, is given by equation (28) in the Appendix. As in equation (4), this solution
has the characteristic that expected IPO underpricing due to uncertainty about ˜ d is strictly
positive only if c is large enough, in which case the expected underpricing is increasing in
the variance of ˜ d (increasing in δ).
11The rationale for when-issued trading: By aggregating information that is widely dispersed
across investors, a liquid when-issued trading market can reveal information that the under-
writer cannot obtain through bookbuilding. This tends to decrease IPO underpricing. In
addition, a market for when-issued trading can aggregate information that is privately held
by informed traders, i.e., information that could potentially be obtained through bookbuild-
ing, but that the underwriter missed. Thus, the market can reduce any residual adverse
selection risk that remains after bookbuilding. Finally, any information released through
when-issued trading is available for free. Hence, less IPO underpricing may be required in
order to obtain information that is held by informed investors.
Open questions: We cannot just assume, however, based on the arguments given above,
that when-issued trading will generally be beneﬁcial for issuers. There are two remaining
open questions. The ﬁrst question is: Under what conditions will when-issued trading open?
As modeled by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), a market may fail to open in the presence of
severe informational asymmetries across traders. If this happens, then when-issued trading
cannot supplant bookbuilding as a source of information for IPO pricing. We will show
in Section 5 that the opening of when-issued trading may be facilitated by using a direct
mechanism (bookbuilding) to collect information held by some of the investors, and then
making the information publicly available. This indeed seems to be what happens before
when-issued trading starts in Germany. There, the when-issued market opens only after the
underwriter posts a price range within which the IPO will be priced. Before this price range
is set, the underwriter appears to gather information from investors; the range then reveals
information the underwriter has received.11
The second question is: Does when-issued trading increase the cost of gathering infor-
mation by means of a direct mechanism? We proposed, as one rationale for when-issued
trading, the notion that because information is provided for free in the when-issued mar-
ket, such trading can decrease the cost of gathering information. However, we also need
to consider the possibility that when-issued trading can interfere with bookbuilding, and
thus make information gathering more expensive. The presence of a when-issued market
11See Aussenegg, Pichler and Stomper (2003).
12may contribute to investors’ reluctance to directly reveal private information, since such
revelation will deprive them of the opportunity to trade on this information. As a result, it
could be more expensive to collect information through bookbuilding in the presence of a
when-issued market, than without when-issued trading. We will show in Section 6 that this
can indeed happen. However, when-issued trading interferes with bookbuilding only if one
of the following conditions holds: i) bookbuilding is not needed for the when-issued market
to open; or ii) bookbuilding is needed, but the when-issued market is very illiquid; or iii)
bookbuilding is needed and information is held by a very small number of investors. In the
ﬁrst case, the presence of a when-issued market should not make issuers worse oﬀ because
bookbuilding is not needed. In the second and third cases it is possible, but by no means
certain, that when-issued trading will make an issuer worse oﬀ. In what follows we will show
that, apart from these two special cases, a when-issued market will make issuers better oﬀ,
in expected value.
In the following section we present some initial results on underpricing due to adverse
selection risk and when-issued trading, thus providing further foundation for our main results.
In Sections 5 and 6 we model the opening of when-issued trading and the bookbuilding
mechanism. It is in these latter two sections that we derive the results described above.
4 Underpricing due to Adverse Selection Risk
According to expression (1), investors face uncertainty about two components of the IPO
value, ˜ s and ˜ d. Some investors have information about ˜ s, and so any uncertainty about
the value of ˜ s will contribute to adverse selection risk. We model the connection between
adverse selection risk and underpricing by building on a simpliﬁed version of the model in
Rock (1986). As these derivations are not central to the paper we present them in the
Appendix and discuss the main results here.
We show in the Appendix that bookbuilding by itself will never cause underpricing due to
adverse selection risk to increase, and will strictly decrease such underpricing if bookbuilding
is informative.12 If when-issued trading occurs in conjunction with bookbuilding (or following
12We deﬁne the informativeness of bookbuilding as the absolute value of he number of positive reports from investors minus
13bookbuilding), then it is possible that when-issued trading will worsen the underpricing due
to adverse selection risk. This can happen if when-issued trading reveals information that
contradicts with the information learned in bookbuilding. However, the results derived in the
Appendix enable us to show that, in expected value (with the expectation calculated prior
to the onset of when-issued trading), when-issued trading will decrease the underpricing due
to adverse selection risk. This is presented in our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1. The expected beneﬁt from when-issued trading, as measured by the decrease
in expected underpricing due to adverse selection risk, is strictly positive.
Proposition 1 veriﬁes one of the claims made in Section 3 as part of the rationale for
when-issued trading. In expected value, when-issued trading decreases underpricing due to
adverse selection risk. We still need to address the two questions posed at the end of Section
3. The ﬁrst of these (Under what conditions will when-issued trading open?), is answered in
the next section.
5 When-issued trading
In this section, we present a model of when-issued trading that is similar to the model of
Glosten and Milgrom (1985). We will use this model to analyze whether the when-issued
market can open, and whether both informed and uninformed investors will participate
in trading. We will ﬁrst derive a condition for this market to open, given that uninformed
investors have access only to information that is contained in expression (1). If this condition
is violated, when-issued trading fails to open. We will next determine whether this problem of
market failure can be resolved by collecting, and then making publicly available, information
that is held by some of the informed investors. Finally, we will analyze problems of market
breakdown after the opening of when-issued trading.
the number of negative. Bookbuilding is informative if this measure is nonzero.
145.1 The Model of When-issued Trading
Players: The players are the same as we have modeled so far, with the following exceptions:
i) the underwriter does not participate in when-issued trading13; ii) the market is facilitated
by purely competitive, risk neutral market makers. As before, a fraction α of the investors
(traders) are informed, with their information structure being the same as described in
Section 3. The market makers are uninformed. All of the players are risk neutral. The
market makers have no inventory costs, or costs of trading.
Time-line: First, the market makers post competitive bid and ask prices. Traders arrive
sequentially. Each arrival either buys one unit at the ask price, or sells one unit at the
bid price. Market makers update their bid and ask prices after every trade. All bid, ask
and transaction prices are publicly observed. Because the market makers have identical
information and no inventory costs, they post identical prices at all times. In what follows,
we will thus refer to a single bid and a single ask price at each point in time.
Information structure: The information structure is similar to that in Glosten and Milgrom
(1985) in that there is a pricing-relevant random variable that has not been observed by the
market makers, and that can take on one of only two values: ˜ s ∈{ − 1,1}.I nb oth models
some fraction α of the potential traders are informed in that they have observed a signal of
this random variable. Our information structure diﬀers from that of Glosten and Milgrom in
that there is another source of uncertainty, captured by the random variable ˜ d.A sdiscussed
above, we interpret this variable as dispersed information that underwriters cannot obtain
directly from investors because they cannot identify investors with private information about
the realization of ˜ d. Correspondingly, we assume that this information is neither available to
any individual traders nor to any market makers in the when-issued market. Instead, we will
extend the model of Glosten and Milgrom to allow ˜ d to aﬀect the arrival rates of liquidity
buyers and sellers. While this extension gives rise to another reason for market failure, it
creates a further potential for when-issued trading to serve as a source of information for
IPO pricing.
13This assumption is consistent with common practice on the German Neuer Markt. See Aussenegg et al. (2003).
15The trader who arrives at time t in the when-issued market values the traded asset at
Zt = E[˜ V |Ft]+ρt, where Ft is the time t trader’s information set. ρt is the valuation
parameter of the time t arrival. We will assume that ρt =0for all informed traders. (We
also assume that the market makers have a valuation parameter of zero.) For uninformed
traders, ρt ∈{ − ρ,ρ}, ρ ≥ 0. An uninformed trader with a valuation parameter of ρ is thus a
potential buyer, while an uninformed trader with a valuation parameter of −ρ is a potential
seller.14
The trading rule is the same as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985): A trader will buy if
Zt >A t = the ask price, and sell if Zt <B t = the bid price. If all Zt ∈ [Bt,A t], then no
trade occurs. Because the market makers are competitive and risk neutral they will post bid
and ask prices such that:
At = ask price = E[˜ V |Ht, time t arrival is a buyer]
Bt = bid price = E[˜ V |Ht, time t arrival is a seller]
where Ht is the market makers’ information set, just before the tth arrival. Ht includes all
past bid, ask and transaction prices, as well as any information that has been revealed prior
to the start of when-issued trading. If an informed trader arrives at time t, the trader has an
information set that includes Ht and the trader’s signal of ˜ s.W eassume that if an uninformed
trader arrives at time t, the trader’s information set includes only the current posted bid
and ask prices, At and Bt.T osimplify the analysis, we will assume that uninformed traders’
expectations are formed in a very simple manner: EU[˜ V |At,B t]=( At + Bt)/2.15
When-issued trading and the aggregation of dispersed information, ˜ d: We now discuss how we
extend the model of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) to allow for correlation between dispersed
14Another diﬀerence between our model and that of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) is that our valuation parameter is additive,
rather than multiplicative. A multiplicative valuation parameter has the eﬀect that liquidity increases when the spread decreases
and/or when the expected value of the asset increases. This means that obtaining positive information through bookbuilding
will always increase the liquidity of the when-issued market, but obtaining negative information may worsen the liquidity
because it decreases the expected value. While this may be realistic, it adds a level of complexity to our analysis that is not
central to our work. For this reason we choose an additive form for our valuation parameter. The eﬀect of this additive form
is that liquidity depends only on the absolute value of the spread.
15Due to asymmetries resulting from our information structure, if uninformed traders knew as much as the market makers,
their valuation would not be exactly the center point of the quotes. However, the simpliﬁcation given here does not aﬀect any
of our qualitative results.
16information about the value of IPO shares, ˜ d, and the arrival rates of liquidity buyers and
sellers.










The probability that any given uninformed arrival is a seller is 1− ˜ λ. The prior distribution
on ˜ λ is uniform on [0,1]. This is a beta distribution with a prior mean of ¯ λ0 =1 /2. Each
uninformed arrival is a random draw from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter ˜ λ.I ftu
is the number of uninformed arrivals and yu is the number of uninformed buyers minus the
number of uninformed sellers, then the updated mean value of ˜ λ is:16
¯ λ(tu,y u)=
1+( tu + yu)/2
2+tu
(6)






5.2 Market failure in the opening of when-issued trading
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) pointed out that if there is asymmetric information in the
market (causing an adverse selection risk), then the ask price will be strictly greater than
the bid price. Thus, a necessary condition for uninformed traders to participate is ρ>0.
If uninformed traders do not participate, the market will breakdown because the market
makers will set the spread so wide that informed traders will also not participate. In our
model there are two reasons, associated with the two sources of uncertainty, ˜ s and ˜ d,w h y
the market may breakdown. In what follows we will determine both necessary and suﬃcient
conditions such that the when-issued market will open, and we will show how these condi-
tions relate to the two sources of uncertainty, ˜ s and ˜ d.W e will then determine conditions
such that problems of market failure in the when-issued market can be resolved if a direct
16This expression for the mean is just a slight transformation of the standard equation for updating a beta distribution:
¯ xt = at/(at + bt), where at =1+the number of successful trials and bt =1+the total number of trials – the number of
successful trials. In our notation above, tu = the total number of trials and yu = the number of successful trials minus the
number of unsuccessful trials.
17mechanism (bookbuilding) is used to obtain information from some informed traders, and if
this information is revealed to all traders. This analysis shows that bookbuilding can only
resolve problems of market failure due to uncertainty about ˜ s, since it is only information
about ˜ s that underwriters obtain in bookbuilding.
Conditions for when-issued trading to open: We begin by assuming that no information is
gathered through a direct mechanism. Thus, prior to the start of when-issued trading, the
expected value of ˜ s is zero. The probability that an informed trader arrives equals α.I nthis
event, it is just as likely that the trader is a seller, as it is that the trader is a buyer. If both
uninformed and informed traders participate in when-issued trading, then the quotes at the
open are given by:








If uninformed traders do not participate in when-issued trading, then no such trading
occurs. To see the reason for this classic result about market failure, note that the opening
quotes would be A1 = v0 +(2q −1)w and B1 = v0 −(2q −1)w.A tthese quotes no informed
traders have any incentives to buy or sell since the quotes are set equal to their valuation of
IPO shares. Hence, none of the traders participate in the market.
We will now derive conditions for when-issued trading to open. This analysis proceeds
in three steps. First, we determine conditions that must be satisﬁed for uninformed traders
to participate in when-issued trading, if informed traders also participate. Next, we derive
a condition for informed traders to participate, given that uninformed traders participate.17
As our ﬁnal step, we determine the general condition for this to happen.
We start with the market participation of the uninformed traders. An uninformed trader
will be willing to buy at the open if v0 + ρ>A 1 and sell if v0 − ρ<B 1.T h us, a necessary
and suﬃcient condition for uninformed traders of both types to participate at the open, if
17In contrast to Glosten and Milgrom (1985), because of uncertainty about ˜ d, informed traders may abstain from trading for
some period of time after the market opens. The necessary requirement for the market to open is that uninformed traders are
willing to participate at the open.
18informed traders also participate, is:
ρ>(A1 − B1)/2 ≡ S1/2=α(2q − 1)w +( 1− α)δ/3. (10)
We next consider the market participation of the informed traders. At the open, a po-
tential informed buyer will value the issue at v0 +( 2 q − 1)w;ap otential informed seller 0
will value the issue at v0−(2q−1)w.B yexamining equations (8) and (9) we can see that, if
uninformed traders participate in trading at the open, then a necessary and suﬃcient condi-
tion for informed traders to also participate is: (2q −1)w>δ / 3. If this condition does not
hold, then only uninformed traders will participate at the open, so that A1 = v0 + δ/3 and
B1 = v0 − δ/3. The market will open with only uninformed traders as long as ρ>δ / 3. If
the market opens with only uninformed traders, then after some periods of trading, enough
uncertainty about ˜ d will be resolved so that informed traders will also participate.
We can now state the condition for when-issued trading to open. The above-stated
conditions for market participation of the two groups of traders imply that the when-issued















If this condition does not hold, then there is market breakdown: trading will not open in
the when-issued market. We will next examine whether this problem can be resolved by
using a direct mechanism (bookbuilding) to obtain information directly from some informed
investors, and by revealing this information to all traders.
Resolving problems of market failure: As before, we let z denote the number of investors
who report to the underwriter that they have observed positive signals minus the number
who report negative signals. We assume that investors who are polled in bookbuilding report
truthfully and we analyze whether problems of market failure can be resolved by making the
value of z publicly available. (We will model the bookbuilding mechanism that achieves this
truthtelling in Section 6.)
At the opening of the when-issued market, the spread A1 − B1 has two components.
Part of the spread is due to uncertainty about dispersed information ˜ d, and part is due to
19asymmetric information about ˜ sw.I fcondition (11) fails to hold due to uncertainty about
dispersed information (high value of δ), then the when-issued market will not open even if
all traders learn the realization of ˜ s,s othat there is no asymmetric information. In this case,
conducting bookbuilding will not enable when-issued trading. However, if condition (11) fails
to hold due to asymmetric information about ˜ s (high value of (2q − 1)w), then the opening
of when-issued trading may be enabled by gathering information through bookbuilding, and
then publicizing the value of z.
The expected value of the IPO, conditioned on information learned in bookbuilding is:
E[˜ V |z]=v0 +( 2 π(z) − 1)w
The above expression is strictly increasing in z.I f z =0 ,then investors’ reports have
eﬀectively canceled each other out. We will say that bookbuilding is informative if |z|≥1.
If z is strictly positive and both informed and uninformed traders participate in when-issued




















−(z)E[˜ V |z − 1]+( 1 − α




where α+(z)( α−(z)) is the probability that the ﬁrst trader in the market is informed, given
that a buyer (seller) has arrived at the open.18
As demonstrated above, uninformed traders participate at the open if and only if:
ρ>(A1 − B1)/2 ≡ S1/2. Thus, the parameter range in which the when-issued market
will open is increased if the spread is narrowed (S1 decreases). It is shown in the proof of
Proposition 2 that the problem is symmetric in that the opening spread is the same regardless
of whether z is positive or negative; it is merely necessary to replace z with |z|.T h us, as
long as something has been learned in bookbuilding, so that |z|≥1, the opening spread

















18The expressions for α+(z) and α−(z) are derived in the proof of Proposition 2 in the Appendix where it is shown that for
z ≥ 1: α+(z)=α−(−z) >α>α −(z)=α+(−z).
20where R(q,z)i sdeﬁned in the Appendix. As above, the maximum is taken because the
spread equals 2δ/3i fwhen-issued trading opens with only the uninformed traders partici-
pating. It is shown in the proof of the following proposition that, as long as bookbuilding
is informative (|z|≥1), the expression given in (14) is strictly less than the spread with no
direct information gathering, as given in (10).
Proposition 2. Opening of when-issued trading.
1. There exist parameter values such that when-issued trading will commence without any
prior direct information gathering, and parameter values such that this cannot occur.
2. Direct information gathering, and public revelation of the information, increases the
parameter range such that when-issued trading can commence.
The second part of the above proposition claims a weak, rather than strict, increase in
the parameter range such that when-issued trading can open. There are two reasons for this.
First, gathering information by means of bookbuilding may fail (z = 0). Second, the when-
issued market may fail to open due to uncertainty about information ˜ d that is too dispersed to
be gathered from investors by means of bookbuilding. In this case, condition (11) fails to hold
due to uncertainty about ˜ d, rather than due to uncertainty about ˜ sw. Since bookbuilding can
only mitigate the second kind of uncertainty, the when-issued market cannot open, regardless
of the informativeness of the direct mechanism. Apart from these two cases, the opening
spread will be strictly narrower if information is directly gathered from informed investors,
and the information is publicly revealed prior to the opening of when-issued trading. As a
consequence, there exist parameter values such that prior information gathering is necessary,
and also with high probability suﬃcient, for the when-issued market to open.
The likelihood that prior information gathering will be both necessary and suﬃcient
depends on the extent to which the opening spread can be reduced by such information
gathering. Thus, it depends in part on the informativeness of bookbuilding as measured
by π(z)=prob{˜ s =1 |z}.W e show in the Appendix that π(z)m ovesa way from one-
half (uncertainty about ˜ s decreases) both as |z| increases and as q, the quality of each
private signal, increases. Moreover, as q increases, the probability that bookbuilding will be
21informative (z  =0 )increases. This is because, as q increases, the probability of disagreement
between investors who participate in bookbuilding decreases. Not only do these two eﬀects
tend to raise the informativeness of bookbuilding, but as indicated by (11), as q increases,
the likelihood that the when-issued market will open without prior information gathering
decreases. We thus have the following Corollary to Proposition 2.
Corollary 1. Prior information gathering is both more necessary and more beneﬁcial
for enabling when-issued trading when the information held by informed investors is more
accurate (higher value of q).
5.3 Market failure after when-issued trading opens
Up to this point we have examined only the opening of when-issued trading, and whether
it is necessary to collect information in order to enable the opening. In what follows we
examine whether the when-issued market breaks down after the opening.
Let yt be the diﬀerence between the number of buy orders and the number of sell orders in
the when-issued market, up to and including the trade at time t.W ehad earlier deﬁned π(z)
as the probability that ˜ s =1 ,given information from bookbuilding. We now deﬁne πt(z,yt)
as the probability that ˜ s =1 ,given also that t trades have taken place in the when-issued
market, and −t ≤ yt ≤ t.19 The calculation of πt(z,yt)i scomplicated by the fact that the
updating is nonlinear: π(z +1 )+π(z − 1)  =2 π(z), unless z =0 .T h us, even though the
actual path (to arrive at yt)d oes not matter, both t (the number of trades) and yt matter.
It is possible that the when-issued market breaks down after it opens. This can happen if
information revealed through trading eﬀectively negates information that was learned prior
to the start of trading. For example, suppose that positive information has been reported in
bookbuilding. Then, a high enough number of sell orders in the when-issued market will cause
the market makers to question the correctness of the information learned in bookbuilding.
As a result, the adverse selection risk faced by the market makers will be higher than at
the open. If, due to adverse selection risk, informative bookbuilding was a prerequisite for
when-issued trading to open, then an increase in such risk can cause the market to break
19If t is odd, then yt can take on any odd value in this range. If t is even, then yt can take on any even value in this range.
22down.
The severity of this problem, however, can be decreased by engaging in more extensive
information gathering prior to the opening of the when-issued market. This is because the
higher the value of z, the less likely it is that informed traders post sell orders. Similarly, the
more negative the value of z, the less likely it is that informed traders post buy orders. Thus,
the likelihood of market breakdown after the open is lower if more information is learned
prior to the opening of when-issued trading.
Proposition 3. Market breakdown after the open. The probability of market
breakdown, due to adverse selection risk in the when-issued market, is decreasing in the
quality of information learned in bookbuilding, as represented by |z|.
If the when-issued market breaks down after trading begins, then underpricing due to
adverse selection risk will be worse than without when-issued trading. Thus, there is no
guarantee that when-issued trading will be beneﬁcial. What the above proposition tells us
is that, if the when-issued market can open only after some information has been publicly
revealed, then the more information that is revealed, the less likely it is that when-issued
trading will cause an increase in underpricing due to adverse selection risk.
6 Direct Mechanisms
In this section we model the process of bookbuilding as a direct mechanism for eliciting
information from investors, possibly in exchange for (implicit) promises of allocations of
underpriced IPO shares. As discussed in Section 3, when-issued trading of IPO shares
may aﬀect the cost of using a direct mechanism to induce investors to reveal their private
information. The reason for this is that these investors have incentives to conceal their
information in order to trade on it. In the following subsections we will ﬁrst model the
bookbuilding process in the absence of when-issued trading, then we will model the process
in the presence of when-issued trading.
236.1 Bookbuilding as a direct mechanism
To keep the model simple we will assume that only two investors participate in bookbuilding.
These investors are referred to as the “polled investors”. There are thus three possible
outcomes of bookbuilding: either both report positive information, both report negative
information, or one reports positive information and the other negative. We will represent the
outcome of bookbuilding with the pair (a,b) ∈{ (+,+),(+,−),(−,−)}. This representation
corresponds to our earlier notation of z ∈{ 2,0,−2}.W e add the notation with “+” and
“−”s oa st ob eable to diﬀerentiate between investors who report diﬀerent outcomes of their
signals. As above, uB represents the expected level of underpricing due to the bookbuilding
process, with the expectation taken before any information has been gathered. We denote by
uab the expected level of underpricing, conditioned on a given outcome (a,b)o fb o okbuilding.






















where the weights on the uab’s are the probabilities of each outcome (a,b)o fbookbuilding.
The objective function may also be written as follows:

























































and where hab is the fraction of the oﬀering that is allocated to a polled investor who reports
a while the other reports b. The objective function is minimized subject to a number of
20We are assuming that the issue size is exogenously given.
24constraints that are stated below.
Participation constraints: We will assume that investors who participate in bookbuilding
cannot be compelled to purchase overpriced shares. Thus, we have the following participation
constraint:21
u





Incentive compatibility constraints: To induce truthful revelation, the underwriter must take
into account the amount that investors can gain from “lying”. We ﬁrst derive the expected
value of IPO shares, given the three possible realizations of bookbuilding, z ∈{ 2,0,−2}:
E[˜ V |z =2 ]=v0 +
(2q − 1)w
q2 +( 1− q)2,E [˜ V |z =0 ]=v0,E [˜ V |z = −2] = v0 −
(2q − 1)w
q2 +( 1− q)2.
An investor who lies increases or decreases the perceived value of z by 2. An investor who
sees positive information, but reports a negative signal thus causes the expected value of ˜ V ,
conditioned on bookbuilding information, to be lower by an amount wL:
wL = expected impact of lie =
(2q − 1)w
q2 +( 1− q)2 (19)
Similarly, an investor who sees negative information and reports positive information will
cause the issue price to be higher by an amount wL.I nvestors will truthfully report their





































where Er+ and Er− are as given in (16) and (17). The constraint (IC−)i swritten based on
the notion that an investor cannot refuse an allocation, without revealing that she has lied.
For this reason, providing false positive information is generally not beneﬁcial to investors,
and (IC−) will typically be nonbinding. This is one aspect of the mechanism design prob-
lem that may change below when we examine bookbuilding in the presence of when-issued
trading.
21This constraint means that the underwriter does not overprice in expected value, conditioned on the information that is
learned in bookbuilding. Actual overpricing may occur, if there remains uncertainty about ˜ V after bookbuilding. We could
also introduce an a priori strictly positive participation constraint: (Er+ + Er−)/2 ≥ γ>0, but adding this extra complexity
will not aﬀect our results. (Note: If γ =0 ,then the a priori constraint is subsumed by (PC− I).)
25Allocation constraints: We assume that the underwriter must allocate a fraction hR of the
IPO to retail investors.
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−+ ≤ 1 − hR
Underpricing due to residual adverse selection risk: We assume that retail investors are
willing to participate as long as they expect to break even. Because the underwriter cannot
distinguish between informed and uninformed retail investors, the retail investors face a
residual adverse selection risk. (The term “residual” is used because this is adverse selection
risk that still remains after collecting information through bookbuilding.) Investors who
participate in bookbuilding do not face an adverse selection risk, because their allocations
are based only on the reported information, not on any information that may still reside with
other investors. For this reason, the constraint (PC− I), which requires only nonnegative
underpricing, is suﬃcient to ensure the participation of the polled investors. For the retail




−− ≥ uAS(−2), (PC− R)
where uAS(z) (ﬁrst introduced in Section 3) represents the underpricing needed due to resid-
ual adverse selection risk. This underpricing is calculated based on the number of positive
reports in bookbuilding minus the number of negative reports = z ∈{ 2,0,−2}. Each con-
straint in (PC− R) needs to be satisﬁed only if shares are allocated to retail investors in
that state. If hR is strictly positive, so that some part of the IPO must always be allocated
to retail investors, then all of the constraints in (PC− R)m ust be satisﬁed.
The optimal direct mechanism: In structuring the mechanism design problem we have as-
sumed that informed investors do not demand strictly positive expected returns in order to
participate in the bookbuilding process. We do this so that we can focus on the incentive
compatibility constraints. In particular, we want to focus on any eﬀect that the presence
of a when-issued market may have on investors’ incentives to truthfully reveal information.
We begin by presenting the optimal direct mechanism, without when-issued trading.
26As shown by Maksimovic and Pichler (2002), if the underwriter is able to gather all
information, so that there is no residual adverse selection risk, then expected underpricing
will be zero. In general, underpricing is needed to induce truthtelling only if there are
allocation restrictions that require that shares be allocated to polled investors, or if the
residual adverse selection risk is so high that it is optimal to allocate all shares to the polled
investors, even when they report negative information. In the standard mechanism design
problem, without when-issued trading: If the optimal solution allows the underwriter to give
no allocations to polled investors when they provide negative information, then underpricing
is not needed in order to induce truthtelling.22
In our model, we do not assume that the underwriter is required to always allocate
shares to the polled investors. In addition, in the Appendix we show that, even though the
underwriter cannot gather all available information, so that there is a strictly positive residual
adverse selection risk, the optimal solution does call for the entire issue to be allocated to
the retail market in the case that both polled investors report negative information. If the
underwriter is not required to always allocate shares to the retail market (hR = 0), then
the entire issue is allocated to polled investors who report positive information. In this
case, positive expected underpricing after bookbuilding occurs only due to residual adverse
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An important aspect of this optimal mechanism is that informed investors do not earn rents
for their information. Strictly positive underpricing occurs only in a state in which the
polled investors receive no shares.
In contrast, polled investors do earn positive rents if there are allocation restrictions. If
the underwriter is required to always allocate shares to the retail market (hR > 0), then
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22This result is an essential part of our analysis. We do not place it inside of a proposition, because it is not new to us. See
Maksimovic and Pichler (2002).
27The optimal direct mechanism still calls for polled investors to receive the maximum possible
allocations when they report positive information. Because of the need to underprice in all
states, due to residual adverse selection risk, the polled investors earn strictly positive ex-
pected returns for reporting positive information. Thus, without when-issued trading, polled
investors earn rents for their information only if there are allocation restrictions imposed on
the design of the mechanism. We next extend the mechanism design problem to account for
the eﬀect of a when-issued market, and check if this result is changed.
6.2 Bookbuilding in the presence of when-issued trading
The optimal mechanism described above may fail to induce truthful reporting if informed
investors can earn strictly positive expected proﬁts by trading on their information, instead
of reporting it to the underwriter. In examining the eﬀect of when-issued trading on book-
building, we will assume that the underwriter is faced with one allocation restriction: the
underwriter must always allocate shares to the retail market (hR > 0).23 Thus, we will
use the underpricing given in equation (20) as our base case for comparison for determining
whether when-issued trading incresases the cost of bookbuilding.
When-issued trading changes the mechanism design problem by aﬀecting the incentive
compatibility constraints in two ways: i) a polled investor who lies has insider trading
opportunities;24 ii) a mistake in pricing may be corrected – i.e., wL may be driven to zero.
The signiﬁcance of this second point is that lying by providing false positive information
may no longer be costly to the investor. As a result, the incentive compatibility constraint
for investors who have observed negative information, which was nonbinding without when-
issued trading, may become binding. In addition, it may become necessary, in the presence
of when-issued trading, for the underwriter to pay strictly positive rents to investors in order
to induce truthtelling.
In what follows we will model the direct mechanism for two diﬀerent cases. First, we
23By ingoring any other possible restrictions, such as a restriction to always allocate some shares to polled investors, we are
biasing the results against when-issued trading. This is because by ignoring such possible constraints we make bookbuilding
without when-issued trading appear less expsive than it might actually be.
24Conceptually, such opportunities also exist in the secondary market, after the IPO has been priced and issued. However,
there may be less competition to trade on such information in the when-issued market. It may also be much easier to sell short
in the when-issued market than in the secondary market.
28consider the case in which when-issued trading can open without any prior information
gathering. This is the case such that the condition (11) is satisﬁed. The signiﬁcance of this
case is that a lie on the part of a polled investor does not aﬀect the opening of the when-
issued market. In the second case, a necessary condition for when-issued trading to open is
that bookbuilding elicits non-contradictory reports from the polled investors. In this case,
a lie on the part of a polled investor will aﬀect the probability that the when-issued market
opens. That is, a lie will aﬀect the probability that the investor can proﬁt by trading on
that lie.25
6.2.1 The case without market failure of when-issued trading
The new incentive compatibility constraints will diﬀer from (IC+) and (IC−)i nt w oways.
First, the expected impact of a lie on the oﬀer price will be lower because when-issued
trading will reveal information that in expected value will counteract the eﬀect of the lie.
We will denote this lower impact by wLT, where wLT <w L. Second, the right-hand side of
each constraint will include the expected proﬁt that informed investors can earn by trading
on their information. We use the symbol ψ
+b
L to denote the expected trading proﬁt for an
investor who sees + but reports −, while the other polled investor reports b, and ψ
−b
L as
the expected trading proﬁt for an investor who sees − but reports +, while the other polled





































where, as in (IC+) and (IC−), Er+ and Er− are as given in (16) and (17).
25Note, if we were to model the mechanism with a large number of polled investors, then a single investor would aﬀect the
opening of the when-issued market only if that investor had rather valuable and independent information. At the same time,
in such a model the investor would make signiﬁcnat proﬁts by trading in the when-issued market only if she had valuable and
independent information. By modeling the mechanism with only two polled investors we capture this eﬀect without an undue
level of modeling complexity.
26The participation constraints will also change in that the right-hand-side will be strictly positive, instead of zero. Er+
and Er− must both be at least as large as expected trading proﬁts, given that the investor doesn’t participate. The new
participation constraints will be satisﬁed as long as the new incentive compatibility constraints are satisﬁed.
29Underpricing due to residual adverse selection risk: As discussed above, when-issued trad-
ing can mitigate informational asymmetries across investors. As a result, uninformed in-
vestors face less severe problems of adverse selection, and less underpricing is required to
induce uninformed investors to buy IPO shares. If when-issued trading fully reveals all rel-
evant information, then underpricing due to residual adverse selection risk will go to zero:
uAS(2),u AS(0) and uAS(−2) → 0.
The optimal direct mechanism: If expected insider trading proﬁts are strictly positive, then
the optimal mechanism described above, for bookbuilding without when-issued trading, will
not satisfy the new incentive compatibility constraints. The precise form of the optimal mech-
anism depends on whether the underwriter is able to condition allocations on the outcome of
when-issued trading.27 It is shown in the proof of Proposition 4 that if the underwriter can-
not condition allocations on the results of when-issued trading, then the optimal mechanism
will call for the underwriter to allocate nothing to the polled investors when they disagree
with each other, but to give them underpriced allocations when they agree with each other.
The polled investors will receive underpriced allocations both when they agree on positive
information and when they agree on negative information.28 If, instead, the allocations can
be conditioned on the outcome of the when-issued market, then the optimal mechanism will
call for the underwriter to allocate nothing to a polled investor whose report is later con-
tradicted by information released by the when-issued market. Underpriced shares will be
allocated to each polled investor who is not contradicted by when-issued trading, regardless
of whether the report was positive or negative.
Regardless of whether allocations can, or cannot, be conditioned on the outcome of when-
issued trading, the optimal mechanism exhibits two key characteristics that are diﬀerent
from the optimal mechanism without when-issued trading. First, the incentive compatibility
constraints are strictly binding. That is, investors must receive strictly positive rents in
order to induce them to truthfully report their signals. Second, these positive rents must
27If polled investors expect to receive commitments of allocations prior to the onset of when-issued trading, then this cannot
be done.
28Note, we do not consider the possibility of collusion on the part of polled investors. This is reasonable in that the underwriter
can prevent collusion simply by not informing one polled investor of the identity of the other.
30be paid to investors who observe negative signals, as well as to those who observe positive
signals. In fact, if the when-issued market is expected to fully reveal all information, then
investors who truthfully report positive signals and investors who truthfully report negative
signals receive identical expected returns. This is in contrast to the optimal mechanism
without when-issued trading, in which those who reported negative signals received no IPO
allocations, and thus no rents for their information. The solution to the mechanism design
problem is thus very much changed due to the presence of the when-issued market. The
following proposition summarizes these changes.
Proposition 4. Bookbuilding with when-issued trading – Part I. If the parameter
values are such that informative bookbuilding is not ap rerequisite for the opening of when-
issued trading, then
1. The bookbuilding mechanism is qualitatively changed due to the possibility of polled in-
vestors proﬁting both from providing false negative and false positive reports.
2. The when-issued market can make bookbuilding more expensive.
The when-issued market will, in expected value, decrease expected underpricing due to
residual adverse selection risk. It will also increase the underpricing that is needed in order to
induce polled investors to truthfully report their signals. If the latter eﬀect dominates, then
when-issued trading will cause an increase in underpricing. That is, when-issued trading
can increase the cost of doing bookbuilding. However, at this point we can only say that
this possibility exists in the case that bookbuilding is not needed for the when-issued market
to function. In what follows we will examine the eﬀect that when-issued trading has on
bookbuilding, in the case that informative bookbuilding is a prerequisite for when-issued
trading to open.
6.2.2 The case with market failure of when-issued trading
We now consider the case in which when-issued trading cannot open on its own. Market
makers, and other uninformed traders, must ﬁrst receive some additional information about
the value of IPO shares, such as information that is reported by investors who participate
31in bookbuilding.29 As a consequence, when-issued trading cannot open unless bookbuilding
elicits non-contradictory reports: z  =0 .W ei nvestigate below how this aﬀects the incentives
of the investors to truthfully report their signals.
Incentive compatibility constraints: An informed investor can expect to proﬁt by trading
on private information in the when-issued market, only if this market opens. If an informed
investor, by refusing to truthfully reveal information, causes bookbuilding to be uninforma-
tive, then the market will not open. There is thus a direct link between truthful reporting
and the likelihood that the when-issued market opens. This link changes the way in which







































These constraints are a cross between the constraints (IC
+
T ) and (IC
−
T ), and those without
when-issued trading, (IC+) and (IC−). Er+ and Er− are the same in all three sets of
constraints. The diﬀerences are in the impact of a lie, and the expected trading proﬁts after
lying. If the polled investors report contradictory signals (+−), then the market does not
open. This market failure means that a lie is not revealed when the polled investors report
diﬀerent things. In this event, the impact of the lie on IPO pricing is given by wL >w LT.
If the when-issued market opens in spite of a lie, then some or all of the lie’s impact will
be corrected. In expectation, the impact of a lie will be w 
LT, for wL >w  
LT ≥ wLT since
when-issued trading may break down after the opening. Finally, false reporting gives rise
to proﬁtable trading opportunities only in the case that a false report results in reported
agreement between the polled investors.
Trading proﬁts of investors who manipulate the outcome of bookbuilding: Before we can
characterize the optimal direct mechanism, we must ﬁrst analyze the expected proﬁt of an
investor who trades in the when-issued market after manipulating the outcome of book-
building by false reporting. A polled investor who sees a negative signal (−), but reports +,
29This information can be made public if the underwriter posts a price range within which he will price the IPO. As discussed
above, if the underwriter commits not to price outside the range, then the posting of the range is not just cheap talk.
32makes no insider proﬁts if the other polled investor reports −. This is because the when-
issued market does not open (z = 0). If the other polled investor reports + and the liar
sells at the open, then she earns expected trading proﬁts of (B1(++)−v0)η, where v0 is her
expected value of the IPO and B1(++) is the market makers’ opening bid price, given that
two positive signals were reported in bookbuilding. η is the size of a unit trade (consistent
with our model of when-issued trading, presented in Section 5), relative to the IPO issue size:
0 <η< <1. An investor who sees + and reports −, makes no insider proﬁts if the other
polled investor reports +. If the other polled investor reports − and the liar buys at the
open, then she earns insider trading proﬁts of (v0 −A1(−−))η, where A1(−−)i sthe market
makers’ opening ask price, given that two negative signals were reported in bookbuilding.
It is shown in the proof of Lemma 2 in the Appendix that (B1(++)−v0)=( v0−A1(−−))η
and that the proﬁt at the open is bounded:
(B1(++) − v0)η ≤
 






Furthermore, this bound is decreasing in α and increasing in q.
Lemma 2. The upper bound on the expected informed proﬁt from trading at the open, as
given in equation (21), is
i) decreasing in α, and
ii) if there are two polled investors, increasing in q.
The bound, ψw
0 η,i sincreasing in q, largely because the impact on expected share value
from a lie, wL,i sincreasing in q.30 However, the probability that a lie prevents the when-
issued market from opening is also increasing in q.T h us, we cannot say that in general the
expected proﬁt from lying is increasing in q.
An insider may trade later than at the open, and may trade more than once. However, we
expect that the upper bound on the insider’s total expected insider trading proﬁt is directly
related to ψw
0 .A sasimpliﬁcation, we will model the upper bound on the total expected












30This is true with only 2 polled investors. If there are more than 2 polled investors, then a single disagreeing investor has
less impact if q is high.
33If the investor could trade the entire issue at the opening quote, then the factor xa would
equal one. Instead, xa is clearly less than one. The earlier and more often that a liar expects
to be able to trade, the higher is xa.T h us, xa is decreasing in α.A ssuch, both x−ψw
0 and
x+ψw
0 are decreasing in α and increasing in q.
The optimal direct mechanism: The optimal mechanism has characteristics of each of the
previous two mechanisms: the optimal mechanism without when-issued trading and the
optimal mechanism in the presence of when-issued trading that can open without informative
bookbuilding. For example, suppose that the two polled investors report diﬀerent signals.
Then, when-issued trading cannot open and the underwriter optimally follows an allocation
policy that is the same as in the case without such trading. The investor who has reported
ap ositive signal receives the maximum possible allocation; the other investor receives no
allocation. If the two polled investors report identical signals, then their allocations will
depend on the parameters of the model. For many parameter values, investors will receive
larger allocations when they report positive signals rather than negative signals, as in the
mechanism without when-issued trading. For some parameter values, polled investors will
receive no rents when they agree with each other.
An important parameter is α, the fraction of potential investors who hold private infor-
mation. An increase in α has two eﬀects on the incentive compatibility constraints. First,
the expected trading proﬁts for a polled investor who lies will be lower, both because of
greater competition to trade on information, and because the expression in equation (21)
will be lower. Second, the cost of underpricing due to adverse selection risk when no in-





small relative to uAS(0), then incentive compatibility can be satisﬁed by paying rents to a
polled investor only in the case that she reports positive information while the other polled
investor reports negative information. As in the case with no when-issued trading (equation
(20)), underpricing will be determined entirely by residual adverse selection risk, not by the
need to induce truthtelling. The only diﬀerence is that, as long as the when-issued market
does not break down, residual adverse selection risk will be lower than without when-issued
trading. It is possible that the when-issued market can break down due to wrong information
34having been observed by both polled investors, and then subsequently contradicted by the
when-issued market. Thus, ex post it is possible that the when-issued market will make un-
derpricing greater. However, if α is not low, then the a priori expected value of underpricing
due to adverse selection risk, with a when-issued market, is less than the expected value of
underpricing due to adverse selection risk without a when-issued market. In addition, if the
when-issued market breaks down due to wrong information being learned in bookbuilding,
then a potentially costly over- or underpricing mistake has been avoided. We thus have the
following result:
Lemma 3. If informative bookbuilding is a prerequisite for when-issued trading to open,
and if α (the fraction of potential investors who hold private information) is large enough so
that (1 − hR) × uAS(0) ≥ ψ
+−
L , then
i) as is the case with no when-issued trading, underpricing is determined entirely by residual
adverse selection risk, not by the need to induce truthtelling.
ii) when-issued trading is beneﬁcial for the issuer.
If instead, the fraction of potential investors who hold private information, α,i ssmall, then
the presence of when-issued trading can make bookbuilding more expensive. The reason is
twofold. First, expected underpricing without when-issued trading is not very high, because
of the low residual adverse selection risk. Second, expected informed trading proﬁts are
higher with smaller α, due to the lower competion. However, as was shown in Section 5
(expression (11)), a smaller value of α also means that bookbuilding is less likely to be needed
in order for the when-issued market to function. If α is small, then informative bookbuilding
is a prerequisite for when-issued trading to open only for some very special cases. The
following proposition summarizes our results in the case that informative bookbuilding is a
prerequisite for when-issued trading to open.
Proposition 5. Bookbuilding with when-issued trading – Part II. If the parameter
values are such that informative bookbuilding is ap rerequisite for the opening of when-issued
trading, then
1. As in bookbuilding with no when-issued trading, it is easier to induce truthtelling from
investors who have observed negative information than from investors who have observed
35positive information.
2. If there are many informed investors (the fraction of potential investors who hold private
information is not too small), then the when-issued market does not make bookbuilding
more expensive.
3. The existence of a when-issued market can make bookbuilding more expensive if one of
the following two conditions holds:
(a) There are few informed investors and the when-issued market is also very illiquid
in the sense that liquidity traders have very low incentives to participate.
(b) There are few informed investors and these investors have very valuable informa-
tion.
As shown earlier, if bookbuilding is not needed for the when-issued market to function,
then this market may increase the cost of gathering information through bookbuilding. But,
in this case it is not necessary to gather information through bookbuilding. If bookbuilding
is needed for the when-issued market to function, this will be for one of two reasons. Either
there is a large adverse selection risk without prior information gathering, or the liquidity
traders do not have very strong incentives to trade (ρ is small), or both of these occur.
A large adverse selection risk occurs either because there is a large number of informed
investors (α large), or because the information held by these investors has a large potential
impact on the IPO value (w large), or both. We have shown that if bookbuilding is needed
because of a large number of informed investors, then the presence of the when-issued market
does not increase the cost of bookbuilding. Thus, it is only when the when-issued market
is very illiquid (in the sense that liquidity traders do not want to trade), or when there is a
very small number of informed investors with very good information, that the existence of a
when-issued market can increase the cost of bookbuilding!
As already described in this paper, the when-issued market has very clear positive bene-
ﬁts.31 For this reason, we cannot say that allowing for a when-issued market is detrimental
to the issuer, even if the two conditions described here are satisﬁed. However, we can say
that a necessary condition for the when-issued market to be detrimental is that either the
31For example, if there is a signiﬁcant cost to overpricing, then the ability of the when-issued market to correct a mistake is
valuable.
36market is very illiquid, or there is only a very small number of very well informed investors.
Thus, in the case that information is broadly held and that the when-issued market is able
to attract broad participation, it appears that when-issued trading is strictly beneﬁcial to
the issuer.
7 Conclusion
We examine in this paper an alternative method for obtaining information to use in pricing
unseasoned securities. This method combines direct information gathering from prospective
investors, through bookbuilding, with information gathering from when-issued trading. We
refer to this method as “alternative” because even though this method is commonly used in
European IPO markets, trading in shares prior to their public issuance is not legal in the
United States. It is our understanding that the rationale behind this ruling is a concern that
when-issued trading may interfere with a ﬁrm’s ability to raise capital in the going public
process. The objective of this paper is to examine that concern.
Our results indicate that, except for very special circumstances, the existence of a when-
issued market will not interfere with the IPO pricing process. Such a market can interfere
with an underwriter’s ability to gather pricing-relevant information directly from investors,
but for the most part, this will occur only in cases such that direct information gathering
is unnecessary. That is, if when-issued trading is able to fully supplant bookbuilding as a
source of information needed to price IPO shares, then it may do so. We ﬁnd, however, that
in most cases in which bookbuilding is an essential part of the IPO pricing process, then
when-issued trading does not interfere. In addition, allowing for when-issued trading strictly
decreases the expected underpricing, thus increasing the expected issuer proceeds.
Thus, our results indicate that allowing for when-issued trading of IPO shares should
be on average beneﬁcial for issuers. We cannot claim, however, based solely on the work
here that when-issued trading of IPO shares should be permitted. We ﬁnd two cases in
which when-issued trading is not beneﬁcial. The ﬁrst is the case in which pricing-relevant
information is very closely held, that is only a very small number of inestors have relevant
information. In this case the issuer is better oﬀ without when-issued trading. But, we would
37argue that this is not a particularly representative case. The second case is the case in which
the when-issued market is not very liquid. For this market to be beneﬁcial to issuers it is
necessary that both informed and uninformed investors are willing to participate. It is not
at all clear that such participation is beneﬁcial to uninformed investors.32




˜ V = secondary market value (post IPO) ∈{ v0 + w + ˜ d,v0 − w + ˜ d}
˜ d ∼ U[−δ,δ]
˜ s ≡ V −v0−˜ d
w ∈{ 1,−1}
˜ ςi = informed trader i’s signal of ˜ s.
Exogenous parameters: (The exogenous parameters are all common knowledge)
v0 = prior expected value of V
w = constant (See above for ˜ V )
δ =b ound on the distribution of ˜ d
q = probability that ςi = s, ∀i; with probability 1 − q, ςi = −s
α = fraction of traders who are informed.
c = cost parameter, for cost of overpricing
ρ =v aluation parameter for liquidity traders ≥ 0; buyers have parameter ρt = ρ;
sellers have parameter ρt = −ρ
η = size of a single trade unit, relative to the total IPO issue size
Other variables:
pI = IPO oﬀer price
z = sum of reported signals by investors polled in bookbuilding
=n umber of positive reports – number of negative reports
π(z)=probability that s =1 ,given z
At = market makers’ ask price at time t
Bt = market makers’ bid price at time t
St = At − Bt = market makers’ time t quoted spread
yt =n umber of buyers – number sellers, up to and including time t trade
πt(z,yt)=probability that s =1 ,given z, t and yt
Bookbuilding variables:
hR = minimum fraction of the oﬀering that must be allocated to retail investors
γ = participation cost for each polled investor
uab = expected underpricing when one polled investor reports a and the other reports b
hab = fraction of oﬀering allocated to polled investor who reports a when other reports b
uab
AS = expected underpricing due to residual adverse selection risk after one polled
investor reports a and the other b
39A: Derivations for Section 3
Derivation of uM, given uncertainty about ˜ s: We derive here the optimal issue price
pI, given the objective function (2) and ignoring the constraint (3). π(z) ≡ the probability
that ˜ s =1 ,given z.W eassume here that 0 <π (z) < 1, so that uncertainty about ˜ s aﬀects
the expected cost due to overpricing. If δ ≥ w:
E[pI − ˜ V |pI > ˜ V,z] prob{pI > ˜ V |z} =

     
     
π(z)
4δ (pI − v0 − w + δ)2 +
1−π(z)
4δ (pI − v0 + w + δ)2 if v0 + w − δ<p I <v 0 − w + δ,
π(z)
4δ (pI − v0 − w + δ)2 +( 1− π(z))(pI − v0 + w)i f v0 + w − δ ≤ v0 − w + δ ≤ pI,
1−π(z)








(pI − v0 − w + δ) −
c(1 − π(z))
2δ








+ v0 − δ +( 2 π(z) − 1)w






(pI − v0 − w + δ) − c(1 − π(z))
pI =
2δ(1 − c(1 − π(z)))
cπ(z)
+ v0 − δ + w










+ v0 − δ − w
The third case holds if δ/c ≤ (1 − π(z))w.T h us, if δ ≥ w:
pI =

     
     
2δ
c + v0 − δ +( 2 π(z) − 1)w if (1 − π(z))w<δ / c<δ− π(z)w,
2δ(1−c(1−π(z)))
cπ(z) + v0 − δ + w if δ/c ≥ δ − π(z)w,
2δ
c(1−π(z)) + v0 − δ − w if δ/c ≤ (1 − π(z))w.
=

     
     





if (1 − π(z))w<δ / c<δ− π(z)w,






if δ/c ≥ δ − π(z)w,





if δ/c ≤ (1 − π(z))w.
(24)
40If δ<w :
E[pI − V |pI >V]prob{pI >V} =

     
     
(1 − π(z))(pI − v0 + w)i f v0 − w + δ<p I <v 0 + w − δ,
π(z)
4δ (pI − v0 − w + δ)2 +( 1− π(z))(pI − v0 + w)i f v0 − w + δ ≤ v0 + w − δ ≤ pI,
1−π(z)




     
     
v0 + w − δ if v0 − w + δ<p I <v 0 + w − δ,
2δ(1−c(1−π(z)))
cπ(z) + v0 − δ + w if v0 − w + δ ≤ v0 + w − δ ≤ pI,
2δ
c(1−π(z)) + v0 − δ − w if pI ≤ v0 − w + δ ≤ v0 + w − δ.
(26)






cπ(z) + v0 − δ + w if 1 ≥ c(1 − π(z)),
2δ











if 1 ≥ c(1 − π(z)),





if 1 <c (1 − π(z)).
(27)
Putting everything together, the expected underpricing due to the cost of an overpricing
mistake is is given by:
uM =

            













− 2(1 − π(z))w if δ ≥ w & δ/c ≥ δ − π(z)w, or






+ 2(1 − π(z))w if δ ≥ w & δ/c ≤ w − π(z)w, or
δ<w&1<c (1 − π(z)).
(28)
B: Underpricing due to adverse selection risk, the derivations
The model presented here is a simpliﬁed version of the model in Rock (1986). It is assumed
that investors arrive randomly in the primary market and decide whether to buy a small
fraction of the issue; these allocations are made on a ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served basis until the
entire issue is sold. Thus, if all of the informed investors participate, on average a fraction
α of the issue will go to informed investors. If an uninformed investor participates in an
oﬀering, then he has a higher probability of receiving an allocation when informed investors
don’t participate. This is the source of the adverse selection risk.
41Through bookbuilding, the underwriter realizes a value z that has been deﬁned above
as the diﬀerence between the number of positive and negative signals reported by investors
who participate in bookbuilding. This variable is a suﬃcient statistic for the information
contained in the investors’ reports. When-issued trading reveals two pieces of information of
relevance for IPO pricing. These are the total number of trades in the when-issued market
prior to the time of IPO pricing, denoted by T, and the number of buy orders minus the
number of sell orders, denoted by yT (yT ∈{ − T,−(T −1),...,0,...,T −1,T}). As discussed
above, when-issued trading may reveal information both about ˜ s and ˜ d, but the latter is not
relevant to the analysis here. We will denote by ¯ dT the expected value of ˜ d, conditioned on
{z,T,yT}.
Let πT(z,yT) denote the probability that s =1 ,given the information reported in book-
building and revealed through when-issued trading. For shorthand we will write πT(z,yT)
simply as πT. Conditional on all publicly available information, the expected value of the
IPO is given by:
E[˜ V |z,T,yT]=v0 +( 2 πT − 1)w + ¯ dT. (29)
An informed investor sees a signal of ˜ s:˜ ςi ∈{ − 1,1}.
prob{˜ s =1 |z,T,yT,ς i =1 } =
qπT
qπT +( 1− q)(1 − πT)
,
prob{˜ s =1 |z,T,yT,ς i = −1} =
(1 − q)πT
(1 − q)πT + q(1 − πT)
.
Given these probabilities, an informed investor values the IPO shares as follows:
E[˜ V |z,T,yT,ς i =1 ]=v0 +
qπT − (1 − q)(1 − πT)
qπT +( 1− q)(1 − πT)
w, (30)
E[˜ V |z,T,yT,ς i = −1] = v0 +
(1 − q)πT − q(1 − πT)
(1 − q)πT + q(1 − πT)
w. (31)
An informed investor who has observed a negative signal will refrain from participating
in the issue if the IPO price pI is such that pI >E [˜ V |z,T,yT,ς i = −1]. Table 1 presents
the expected issue value and the expected allocations to each group of investors (informed
and uninformed), for each possible realization of ˜ s. The expected secondary market value
is conditioned on all information that has been gathered and on the realization of ˜ s. The
allocations are written as fractions of the total issue. This table is written assuming that
pI >E [˜ V |z,T,yT,ς i = −1], so that investors who have observed negative signals do not
participate.33 The table shows that the exposure of uninformed investors to adverse selec-
tion risk depends on the probability q with which informed investors correctly observe the
33The informed participation given in Table 1 is the participation, conditioned on the realization of ˜ s.W e assume that
the number of investors who have revealed their information is small relative to the total number of informed investors who
may participate in the oﬀering. Thus, the relative level of informed participation is not aﬀected by bookbuilding or when-
issued trading. The eﬀect of this assumption is that the expected underpricing calculated here is really an upper bound on
underpricing.
42Realization of ˜ s s = −1 s =1
Probability of this realization 1 − πT πT
Expected secondary market value ˜ V v0 − w + ¯ dT v0 + w + ¯ dT
Allocation to informed investors (1 − q)α qα




Table 1: Expected IPO Value and Allocations
realization of ˜ s.I fq =1 /2, then there is no adverse selection risk because the uninformed
investors expect to receive the same number of shares, regardless of the realized value of ˜ s.
But, if q>1/2, then the uninformed will on average receive more shares if the value of these
shares is low (s = −1).
In order to induce uninformed investors to participate in the oﬀering, the expected return
to these investors must be nonnegative. When underpricing is minimized, this expected
return will be zero:
0=( 1− πT)
 
v0 − w + ¯ dT − pI




v0 + w + ¯ dT − pI
  1 − α
1 − (1 − q)α
, (32)
where the ﬁrst (second) term is the product of the expected return to the uninformed in-
vestors if s = −1( s = 1), and the fraction of the oﬀering allocated to them. Each term is
multiplied by the probability with which ˜ s takes on that realization. Solving equation (32)
for pI yields:34
pI = v0 + ¯ dT +
 
2πT − 1 − (πT + q − 1)α
1 − ((2πT − 1)q +1− πT)α
 
w. (33)
If α =0 ,then the expression in (33) equals E[˜ V |πT], as given in equation (29). As α → 1,
the expression in (33) → E[˜ V |z,T,yt,ς i = −1], as given in equation (31). This result is
quite intuitive: as α → 1, uninformed investors face so severe an adverse selection problem
that they are willing to participate in the IPO only at a price that approaches the lowest
possible valuation that can be assigned by an informed investor.
The expected underpricing is:
uAS(z,T,yT)=E[˜ V |z,T,yT] − pI =
q − 2πT(1 − πT) − (2πT − 1)2q
1 − ((2πT − 1)q +1− πT)α
αw, (34)
If πT =0o rπT =1 ,s othat perfect information about ˜ s is available, then the above is zero.










34Consistent with the assumption behind Table 1, pI >E [˜ V |z,T,yT,ς i = −1].
43Expression (34) contains as a special case the expected level of IPO underpricing due to
adverse selection risk, in the absence of when-issued trading. In Section 3, this was denoted
as uAS(z), given by: uAS(z)=uAS(z,0,0). Lemma 1 characterizes how this expected level
of underpricing depends upon the informativeness of bookbuilding, as measured by |z|.A s
we claimed in Section 3, uAS(z) decreases as bookbuilding becomes more informative (|z|
becomes larger).
Lemma 1. Underpricing due to adverse selection risk. Expected underpricing due to
adverse selection risk is: i) strictly decreasing in |πT − 1/2|, for all values of πT ≤ 1/2 and
πT ≥ 1/2+α(q − 1/2), and ii) stricly lower for πT =1 /2+α(q − 1/2), than for πT =1 /2.
Thus, with only bookbuilding (no when-issued trading), expected underpricing due to adverse
selection risk is strictly decreasing in the informativeness of bookbuilding, as measured by |z|.
Derivation of π(z):
π(z)=
prob{ςi|s =1 }prob{s =1 |zb∼i = z − ςi}
prob{ςi|s =1 }prob{s =1 |zb∼i = z − ςi} + prob{ςi|s = −1}prob{s = −1|zb∼i = z − ςi}
=
prob{ςi|s =1 }π(z − ςi)
prob{ςi|s =1 }π(z − ςi)+prob{ςi|s = −1}(1 − π(z − ςi))
(36)
If ςi =1 :
π(z)=
qπ(z − 1)
qπ(z − 1) + (1 − q)(1 − π(z − 1))
(37)
If ςi = −1:
π(z)=
(1 − q)π(z +1 )
(1 − q)π(z +1 )+q(1 − π(z + 1))
(38)
π(0)=1 /2 π(1) = qπ (−1) = 1 − q =1− π(1)
π(2) =
q2
q2 +( 1− q)2 π(−2) = 1 − π(2)


















q|z| +( 1− q)|z| (41)





qz +( 1− q)z −
qz(ln(q)qz + ln(1 − q)(1 − q)z)
(qz +( 1− q)z)2
=
qz(ln(q) − ln(1 − q))(1 − q)z
(qz +( 1− q)z)2 > 0 (42)
44The above is positive because q>1 − q. Similarly, for z ≤ 0, π(z)i sdecreasing in |z|.




q − 2π(1 − π) − (2π − 1)2q






2(2q − 1)(1 − 2π)(1 − (1 − q)α − (2q − 1)πα)+( 2 q − 1)α(q − 2π(1 − π) − (2π − 1)2q)
(1 − ((2π − 1)q +1− π)α)2
This has the same sign as
2(1 − 2π) − 2(1 − 2π)(1 − q +( 2 q − 1)π)α +( q − 2π(1 − π) − (2π − 1)
2q)α
= 2(1 − 2π) − 2(1 − π)
2α +( 1− 2π)
2qα+ qα (43)
If π =1 /2, then (43) is strictly positive. (43) is strictly negative if π =1 /2+α(q − 1/2).










(π =1 /2+α(q − 1/2)) =
(2q − 1)(1 − α2(2q − 1)2)
2 − α − α2(2q − 1)2
Also, if z =1 ,then π(z)=q>1/2+α(q − 1/2).
The implication of Lemma 1 is that bookbuilding by itself will never increase underpricing
due to adverse selection risk, and will strictly decrease such underpricing if bookbuilding is
informative (|z|≥1).
Proof of Proposition 1. This follows from the ﬁrst part of Lemma 1 and:
i) If π0 =1 /2, then |π1 − 1/2|≥α(q − 1/2). (As is shown in Section 5, equality holds if
δ =0and strict inequality holds if δ>0.)
ii) prob{z × yT < 0} <prob{z × yT > 0}.I f|π − 1/2| > 0, then |π − 1/2| is expected to
increase due to when-issued trading.
C: Derivations and proofs for Section 5
Proof of Proposition 2. The ﬁrst part of the proposition has already been proved. For
the second part, we need to show that for any |z|≥1, the opening spread is strictly smaller
than with z =0 .
α+(z)=probability of an informed arrival at the open, given z and given that a buyer
has arrived.




prob{informed buyer at open}
prob{buyer at open}
= α
qπ(z)+( 1− q)(1 − π(z))
(1 − α)/2+αqπ(z)+α(1 − q)(1 − π(z))
α
−(z)=
prob{informed seller at open}
prob{seller at open}
= α
(1 − q)π(z)+q(1 − π(z))
(1 − α)/2+α(1 − q)π(z)+αq(1 − π(z))




qz+1 +( 1− q)z+1





q(1 − q)(qz−1 +( 1− q)z−1)
(1 − α)(qz +( 1− q)z)/2+αq(1 − q)(qz−1 +( 1− q)z−1)
< 1
(The inequalities above come from the fact that q>1/2. Thus, qz+1 +( 1− q)z+1 >q z/2+
(1 − q)z/2 >q z(1 − q)+q(1 − q)z.) Applying equation (41), it is seen that for z ≤− 1, α+






We thus present the details only for positive z.I fz ≥ 1:
E[˜ V |z]=v0 +( 2 π(z) − 1)w = v0 +
qz − (1 − q)z
qz +( 1− q)zw.
If both informed and uninformed traders participate in when-issued trading, the opening







= v0 +( 2 π(z +1 )− 1)wα





q(z+1) − (1 − q)(z+1)
q(z+1) +( 1− q)(z+1)wα
+(z)+
qz − (1 − q)z











= v0 +( 2 π(z − 1) − 1)wα





q(z−1) − (1 − q)(z−1)
q(z−1) +( 1− q)(z−1)wα
−(z)+
qz − (1 − q)z





The problem is symmetric in that the opening spread is the same regardless of whether z is


























q(|z|+1) − (1 − q)(|z|+1)
q(|z|+1) +( 1− q)(|z|+1) − α
−(z)
q(|z|−1) − (1 − q)(|z|−1)




q(|z|) − (1 − q)(|z|)
q(|z|) +( 1− q)(|z|)
















If δ/3 ≥ (2q − 1)w, then the spread is determined entirely by uncertainty about demand
and bookbuilding will not tighten the opening spread. Otherwise, a suﬃcient condition
for bookbuilding to tighten the opening spread is: ∆R(z)w −
∆α(z)δ
3 > 0. Or, because
δ/3 < (2q − 1)w,asuﬃcient condition is:
X(z) ≡ ∆R(z) − (2q − 1)∆α(z) > 0 (47)




















2q − 1 − 2(π(z) − π(z − 1))
 
It is easy to show that the above is strictly positive when z =1 . Using (42) and the fact
that q>1/2, we see that (π(z) − π(z − 1)) is decreasing in z, ∀z ≥ 1. Thus, condition (47)
is satisﬁed ∀|z|≥1.
Proof of Proposition 3. We only present results where z ≥ 0. Because of symmetry, the
results will carry through to z ≤ 0. We have already shown that ∂π(z)/∂z > 0 for z ≥ 0.
Also, the probability that the next arrival is a buyer is increasing in π(z), because q>1/2.
Thus, this probability is increasing z.
In addition, X(z) (deﬁned in the proof of Proposition 2) is increasing in z.T h us, the
opening spread is decreasing in z.T h us, there must exist some g∗ ≥ 0 such that the market
will open (or stay open) iﬀ |πt(z,yt) − 1/2|≥g∗.I fρ is large enough, then g∗ will be zero
and there will be no concern about market breakdown. Suppose instead that g∗ is strictly
positive. Then, even if |z| is large enough for the when-issued market to open, there is a
strictly positive probability of market breakdown at some time in the future. This probability
is strictly decreasing in z, for two reasons: i) For larger z, more sell orders must arrive for
|πt(z,yt) − 1/2| to fall below g∗; ii) the probability that a buyer (instead of a seller) arrives
at any time in the when-issued market is strictly increasing in z.
D: Derivations and proofs for Section 6
Underpricing due to residual adverse selection risk, without when-issued trading.










q − 2π(z)(1 − π(z)) − (2π(z) − 1)2q
1 − ((2π(z) − 1)q +1− π(z))α
π(2) =
q2
























(2q − 1)2q2(1 − q)2

























(2q − 1)2q2(1 − q)2
(q2 +( 1− q)2)(q2 +( 1− q)2 − αq(1 − q))
(50)
Note: q>1/2= ⇒ 1 − 3q(1 − q) >q (1 − q)= ⇒ uAS(2) >u AS(−2)
uAS(0) is strictly increasing in q. When q is close to 1/2, ∂uAS(2)/∂q and ∂uAS(−2)/∂q are
positive; when q is close to one, ∂uAS(2)/∂q and ∂uAS(−2)/∂q are negative.










































First assume that γ = hR =0 .The underwriter will not be able to fully eliminate the adverse
selection risk, so we need to consider two possible solutions to the constrained optimization
problem: Solution 1: Everything is allocated to retail in state −−. h−+ = h−− = u++ =
u+− =0 ;u−− = uAS(−2). No underpricing is needed for truthtelling, but is needed for
residual adverse selection risk. uB = uAS(−2)(q2 +( 1− q)2)/2.
Solution 2: Nothing is allocated to retail. Underpricing is needed for truthtelling, but not




















++ +2 q(1 − q)u




q2 +( 1− q)2
2
 
uAS(−2) ,q (1 − q)wL
 
(q2 +( 1− q)2)
2
uAS(−2) =
q2(1 − q)2(2q − 1)wα
(q2 +( 1− q)2 − αq(1 − q))
48q(1 − q)wL =
q(1 − q)(2q − 1)w
q2 +( 1− q)2
(q2 +( 1− q)2)q(1 − q)α<q 2 +( 1− q)2 − αq(1 − q). Thus, if γ = hR =0 :
uB =
 




If hR > 0, then underpricing due to residual adverse selection risk occurs in all states. The
IC constraints are satisﬁed because:
i) uAS(0) <w L. This follows directly from comparing equations (19) and (48). And
ii) uAS(2) <u AS(0). (It has been demonstrated that underpricing due to adverse selection
is decreasing in z for z ≥ 0.)
Thus, h−+ = h−− =0and the expected underpricing is given by (20).
Proof of Proposition 4. We start with the case in which allocations cannot be conditioned
on when-issued trading. The constraints (IC
+
T ) and (IC
−
T ) can be rewritten as:
 
q























































L +2 q(1 − q)ψ
−+
L (54)
If the when-issued market is expected to be fully informative, so that wLT → 0, then con-
straints (53) and (54) become:
 
q























































L +2 q(1 − q)ψ
−+
L (56)
Because q2+(1−q)2 > 2q(1−q), it is optimal to set u+−h−+ = u+−h+− =0and u++h++ =
u−−h−− > 0. Because the right-hand sides of (55) and (56) are strictly positive, and because
residual adverse selection risk goes to zero, (55) and (56) are strictly binding and strictly
positive rents must be paid to induce truthtelling.
We next consider the case in which allocations can be conditioned on when-issued trading.
We will assume here that the when-issued market is informative, so that misinformation on













































































































L +2 q(1 − q)ψ
−+
L (58)
where the subscript c (w) represents the state such that when-issued trading indicates that
the investor’s report was correct (incorrect). Using the same arguments as above (where
allocations cannot be conditioned on when-issued trading), the optimal mechanism calls
for zero rents whenever the when-issued market provides information indicating that the
investor’s report was wrong: uabhab
w =0 ,∀ pairs (a,b). Also, for the same reasons as above,
constraints (57) and (58) are strictly binding and strictly positive rents must be paid to
induce truthtelling.
Furthermore, if we can assume that the right-hand sides of the constraints (57) and (58)
are equal (This will be supported by the proof of Lemma 2 below.), then the expected rents
are equal for those who have observed negative and positive information. This is true both
when allocations can be conditioned on when-issued trading, and when they cannot.
Proof of Lemma 2. From the proof of Proposition 2:
A1(−−)=v0 − (2q − 1)wα
+(−2) −
2q − 1






B1(++) = v0 +( 2 q − 1)wα
−(2) +
2q − 1






As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, α−(2) = α+(−2), thus





1 − 2q(1 − q)α−(2)
















The ﬁrst term of equation (61) represents the expected proﬁt related to the impact of a lie
on the public expected value of the IPO, wL.A sindicated by the second term, this expected
proﬁt is decreased if there is additional uncertainty about the IPO value that cannot be
resolved through bookbuilding (δ>0).











= 2(2q − 1)α





















−α(1 − α)(2q − 1)/2
((1 − α)(q2 +( 1− q)2)/2+αq(1 − q))
2 < 0
The upper bound on ψ0 is (1 − 2q(1 − q)α−(2))wL. This upper bound is clearly decreasing
in α and increasing in q.
Proof of Lemma 3. The participation constraints will change in that investors will
wantastrictly positive return. We assume, however, that there are more than two investors
who can reveal information in bookbuilding. The proﬁt to trading on private information,
after two other investors have revealed their information, is not nearly as high as the proﬁt
that can be earned after lying. We can thus continue to treat the participation constraints




 ) and (IC
−
T
 ) can be rewritten as:
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≥ 2q(1 − q)ψ
−+
L (63)
If the investors agree due to a lie, then with probability 1/2 the market will break down after
it opens. If this happens, then this is equivalent (in terms of information available before
pricing) to the two investors having truthfully reported +−.I fthe market does not break
down, then it conﬁrms that the lie was actually correct. Thus, if the market is informative,
w 
LT =0 .W erewrite constraints (62) and (63), allowing the allocations to be conditioned






































































≥ 2q(1 − q)ψ
−+
L (65)
where the subscript c (w) indicates that the when-issued market indicated that the investor’s
report was correct (wrong). As in the proof of Proposition 2, we will solve for the mechanism
both in the case in which allocations can be conditioned on when-issued trading and in the
case in which they cannot. In the latter case we will simply require that haa
c = haa
w .
The participation constraint for retail participation in the IPO requires that: u+−,u ++
w ,u −−
w ≥




2 +( 1− q)
2




α ≤ 2/3i ss uﬃcient so that uAS(0) <w L/2. The optimal mechanism is similar to that

























































+−)(1 − hR) ≥ 2q(1 − q)ψ
−+
L (68)
(1 − q)2uAS(0) < (1/2)(q2 +( 1− q)2)(uAS(2) + uAS(−2)). Thus, a mechanism that sets
u+− = u++
w = u−−
w = uAS(0) and underpricing otherwise equal to zero is strictly less costly
than the mechanism without when-issued trading. In such a mechanism haa
w is optimally
set to zero because q>1/2. If allocations cannot be conditioned on when-issued trading,
then no allocations are given to the polled investors when they agree with each other. This
results in the following IC constraints:





2 +( 1− q)
2
 
(wL − uAS(0))(1 − hR) ≥ 2q(1 − q)ψ
−+
L (70)




L are small relative to u
+−
AS and wL − u
+−
AS, then the
above constraints are satisﬁed.
Proof of Proposition 5. The ﬁrst two points of the proposition follow directly from the
proof of Lemma 3. In constraints (64) and (65) the term wL does not go to zero, because the
market does not open when the polled investors disagree. Thus, constraint (65) is easier to
satisfy than constraint (64). The second point follows from expressions (69) and (70). If α
is small, these inequalities will not be satisﬁed, and the incentive compatibility constraints
cannot be satisﬁed just with the underpricing that is caused by residual adverse selection
risk.
Continuing from the analysis of Section 5, the following three conditions must be satisﬁed in
order for informative bookbuilding to be necessary, and suﬃcient, for when-issued trading:
ρ − (1 − α)δ/3 ≤ α(2q − 1)w =( 2− α)uAS(0)





(2α − α+(2) − α−(2))δ
6
+
(q3 − (1 − q)3)
(q3 +( 1− q)3)
wα+(2)
2





(q2 +( 1− q)2)
w(α+(2) − α−(2))
2
52(We know that: 0 < (2α − α+(2) − α−(2))δ/6 <α δ / 6.)
If δ is large, then the when-issued market will not open, regardless of whether there is
informative bookbuilding. To simplify, we will let δ =0 .The above conditions become:
α(2q − 1)w ≥ ρ>
(q3 − (1 − q)3)
(q3 +( 1− q)3)
wα+(2)
2





(q2 +( 1− q)2)
w(α+(2) − α−(2))
2
As q → 1, the above condition → αw ≥ ρ>0. Thus, even a very illiquid when-issued market
(ρ small) can be enabled by bookbuilding if q is large. If α is very small, then bookbuilding
is needed for when-issued trading to open only if the market is very illiquid (ρ small) or the
information is very valuable (w very large).
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